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in fact insecure against the stolen-verifier attack and replay attack. Then, we
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a different user authentication mechanism, which does not require the home
agent to share a static secret key with the foreign agent, and hence, it is more
practical and realistic. We show that our proposed scheme can provide stronger
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Nowadays, with the fast development of mobile technologies, Global Mobility
Networks (GLOMONETs) have become widely available and interconnected.
To provide global roaming service for a mobile user, remote authentication
is an essential requirement. A typical remote authentication scenario involves
three parties, namely a Mobile User (MU), a Foreign Agent(FA) and a Home
Agent(HA). When a mobile user MU roams into a foreign network, the foreign
agent FA authenticates the roaming user with the help of the user’s home agent
HA[1,10,11].
During the roaming process in GLOMONET, the mobile user MU is very
much concerned about its privacy protection. The user’s identity should be
protected and his/her location and activities should be kept unlinkable. It is
desirable to keep mobile users’ identities anonymous in the remote user au-
thentication process. In recent years, many anonymous authentication scheme
(e.g.[22,12,21,2,13,6,14,19,7,8]) have been proposed for roaming services in
GLOMONET. However, most of the existing protocols were broken shortly
after they were proposed.
Mutual Authentication is a very important security feature. It requires
that the client and server prove their respective identities to each other before
performing any application functions. Recently, many research work(e.g.[22,
4,8,23,24,20]) have been done in the design and analysis of mutual authen-
tication protocols. However, some of them have been proved to be insecure
against known attacks.
In 2012, Jiang et al. [9] pointed out the security flaws in some previous
smart card based anonymous user authentication protocols. In order to remedy
those weaknesses, Jiang et al. proposed an authentication scheme based on
quadratic residue assumption, which is very efficient. Hence, Jiang et al.’s
scheme seems to be a very good candidate authentication protocol for adoption
in practice. Therefore, it is very interesting to analyze this scheme in detail
to ensure that the security claims that are provided by the authors hold. It is
unfortunate that we found some serious flaws in their scheme. In particular,
the scheme is insecure due to two important issues namely the stolen-verifier
attack [17] and it cannot resist against replay attacks.
Our Contributions. The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we show
there exist several serious security flaws in Jiang et al.’s anonymous user au-
thentication scheme, which are described as follows: 1) It is vulnerable to
stolen-verifier attack. An attacker who has stolen the verifier table can obtain
the session key SK and can impersonate the FA to fool the MU. 2) It also
cannot resist replay attacks. Although the attacker cannot get the MU’s ses-
sion key shared with the FA, he/she can impersonate the MU to login the FA.
3) It is vulnerable to denial of service attack.
Second, we propose a new smart card based anonymous user authentication
protocol for roaming service in global mobility networks. Our protocol makes
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use of a user authentication mechanism which is different from the previous
approaches and can successfully prevent different kinds of network attacks.
Organization of the Paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we provide some mathematical preliminaries, which will be used
throughout the paper. In Section 3, we briefly review Jiang et al.’s scheme.
Subsequently, we show its weaknesses in Section 4. Then, we proceed with
proposing our scheme in Section 5, together with analyzing its security in
Section 6. In Section 7, we compare the performance of our new protocol with
the previous schemes. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Mathematical Preliminaries
In this section, we discuss three computational problem: Quadratic residue
problem, discrete logarithm problem and computational Diffie-Hellman prob-
lem, which will be used throughout the paper.
2.1 Quadratic Residue Problem
Assume that n = pq, where p and q are two large primes. If y = x2 mod n has
a solution, i.e., there exists a square root for y, then y is called a quadratic
residue mod n. The set of all quadratic residue numbers in [1, n−1] is denoted
by QRn. Then the quadratic residue problem states that, for y ∈ QRn, it
is hard to find x without the knowledge of p and q due to the difficulty of
factoring n [16].
2.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem
Let G be a finite group, g ∈ G with order n, y ∈ Gg. The problem is to find
the smallest integer x ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} such that gx = y (mod n). It is easy to
compute the discrete exponentiation y = gx (mod n) given g, x, n, but it is
computationally infeasible to determine x given y, g, n, when n is large.
2.3 Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
Consider a cyclic group G with order q. The CDH problem states that, given
g, gx, gy for a generator g and random number x, y ∈ {1, 2, ..., q − 1}, it is
computationally intractable to compute the value gxy.
The notations that will be used throughout this paper are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1 Notations
MU The Mobile user
IDMU Identity of MU
PWMU Password of MU
HA Home agent of MU
IDHA Identity of HA
FA Foreign agent of MU roamed
IDFA Identity of FA
x master secret key stored in HA
ctrMU A counter of MU
SK Session key shared between A and B
h(·) A secure collision-free one-way hash function
A ⊕ B XOR operation of A and B
A‖B Data A concatenates with data B
3 Review of Jiang et al.’s scheme
Jiang et al.’s smart card based anonymous authentication scheme comprises
three phases, namely the registration phase, the login and authentication phase
and the password update phase. Each foreign agent shares a unique long-term
KFH with HA.
3.1 Registration Phase
Step 1. The MU sends his/her IDMU to HA via a secure communication
channel. HA computes KMU = h(IDMU‖x) using the secret random number
x.
Step 2. HA personalizes the smart card with h(·),KMU , n and sends it to MU,
where n is the modulus in the Quadratic Residue Problem.
Step 3. After receiving the smart card, the MU computes K∗MU = KMU ⊕
h(IDMU‖PWMU ) and replaces KMU with K∗MU . Finally, the smart card con-
tains h(·),K∗MU , n.
3.2 Login and Authentication Phase
Step 1. MU inserts his/her smart card into the device and enters his/her
identity IDMU and password PWMU . The smart card computes KMU =
K∗MU ⊕ h(IDMU‖PWMU ). Then the smart card generates a random num-
ber nMU and computes V1 = (IDMU‖KMU‖nMU‖IDFA)2 mod n. Finally,
MU sends a login message M1 = (V1, IDHA) to FA.
Step 2. Upon receiving M1, FA generates a random number nFA and com-
putes V2 = h(M1‖nFA‖KFH). Subsequently, FA sends the message M2 =
(M1, IDFA, nFA, V2) to HA.
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Step 3. After receiving M2, HA checks whether IDFA is the identity of an ally.
If it is true, HA compares V2 with V ∗2 = h(M1‖nFA‖KFH). If V2 = V ∗2 , HA ter-
minates the protocol. Otherwise, HA solves V1 by using the Chinese Remainder
Theorem with p and q to get IDMU ,KMU , nMU , IDFA. Then, HA computes
h(IDMU‖x) and compares it with the received KMU . If they are equal, the
authenticity of MU is ensured. Also, HA believes FA is the target foreign
agent of MU. After that, HA computes SK = h(h(IDMU‖x)‖IDFA‖nMU
‖nFA), V3 = SK ⊕ h(KFH‖nFA) and V4 = h(V3‖KFH), where SK is the
session key between FA and MU. Finally, HA sends M3 = (V3, V4) to FA.
Step 4. After receiving the message M3, FA computes V ∗4 = h(V3‖KFH) and
checks whether V ∗4 = V4. If it is valid, FA computes SK = V3 ⊕ h(KFH‖nFA)
and V5 = h(SK‖nFA), and sends M4 = (nFA, V5) to MU.
Step 5. Upon receiving M4, MU computes SK∗ = h(h(IDMU‖x)‖IDFA ‖nMU
‖nFA). Then MU computes V ∗5 = h(SK∗‖nFA) and checks whether it is equal
to V5. If it is true, then MU establishes trust with FA; otherwise, the authen-
tication fails.
3.3 Password Change Phase
When MU wants to renew a password, MU inserts his/her smart card into
the terminal and enters his/her identity ID∗MU , the old password PWMU , and
the new password PW ∗∗MU . Then the smart card retrieves KMU = K
∗
MU ⊕
h(ID∗MU‖PWMU ) and computes K∗∗MU = KMU ⊕ h(ID∗MU‖PW ∗∗MU ). Finally,
the smart card stores K∗∗MU in place of K
∗
MU
4 Security Analysis of Jiang et al.’s Scheme
4.1 Security against Stolen-Verifier Attacks
In Jiang et al.’s scheme, it is assumed that each foreign agent shares a unique
long-term key KFH with HA which should be stored in the verifier table of
HA’s database. In case the verifier table in the HA’s database is leaked out or
stolen by an attacker, the attacker can compute SK corresponding to any user
MU and can also proceed to spoofing attack. This is illustrated as follows.
4.1.1 Computing SK
Step 1. Eavesdrops a login request message M2 = (M1, IDFA, nFA, V2) and
the corresponding message M3 = (V3, V4).
Step 2. Computes h(KFH‖nFA) using the stolen long-term key KFH and nFA.
Step 3. Computes SK = V3 ⊕ h(KFH‖nFA).
It can be seen that Jiang et al.’s protocol does not achieve perfect forward
secrecy if the attacker obtains the FA’s long-term key KFH shared with HA.
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4.1.2 Spoofing Attack
Step 1. Intercepts a login request message M2 = (M1, IDFA, nFA, V2) and
chooses a random number n′FA, and then computes V
′
2 = h(M1‖n′FA‖KFH) us-
ing the stolen long-term key KFH and n′FA. Sends M
′






Step 2. The HA authenticates the MU and FA following the step 3 of Jiang




4) to the attacker, where V
′
3 =
SK ′ ⊕ h(KFH‖n′FA), V ′4 = h(V ′3‖KFH), SK ′ = h(h(IDMU‖x)‖IDFA‖nMU
‖n′FA).




4), the attacker computes
SK ′ = V ′3 ⊕ h(KFH‖n′FA), V ′5 = h(SK ′‖n′FA) and sends M ′4 = (n′FA, V ′5) to
the MU.
Step 4. The MU computes SK∗ = h(h(IDMU‖x)‖IDFA‖nMU‖n′FA), V ∗5 =
h(SK∗‖n′FA) and conforms V ∗5 = V ′5 . The MU believes that the attacker is
the FA.
Hence, it is clear that the attacker can impersonate the FA whenever he/she
likes.
4.2 Security against Replay Attacks
In Jiang et al.’s scheme, during the login and authentication phase, the MU
sends the login message M1 = (V1, IDHA) to FA via a public channel, where
V1 = (IDMU‖KMU‖nMU‖IDFA)2 mod n. Suppose an attacker intercepts this
message and sends another message M ′1 = M1 in the next time to FA. Then
after receiving this message during login and authentication phase, the FA











2) to HA. After
receiving M ′2, then HA also processes this message and ensures that the at-
tacker is a legal user. Although the attacker cannot obtain the session key SK,
he/she can impersonate the MU to login to the FA. As a result, Jiang et al.’s
scheme fails to provide protection against a strong replay attack.
4.3 Security against Denial of Service Attack
In the password change phase, there is no verification of old password before
the new password is updated. If an attacker manages to gain temporary access
to MU’s smart card, he/she can launch a denial of service attack as follows:
1) Inserts MU’s smart card into a card reader and initiates a password
change request.
2) Submits two random strings R1, R2 as MU’s old password and new
password.
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3) The smart card computes K∗∗MU = h(IDMU‖x) ⊕ h(IDMU‖PWMU ) ⊕
h(IDMU‖R1) ⊕ h(IDMU ‖R2) and updates K∗MU with K∗∗MU .
Once the value of K∗MU is updated, the MU cannot login successfully even
if he/she gets his/her smart card back because K∗∗MU ⊕ h(IDMU‖PWMU ) =
h(IDMU‖x), and since then MU’s login request will be denied by HA during
the login and authentication phase.
5 The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose a new authentication scheme with privacy preser-
vation for global mobility networks. Notably, the new scheme makes use of a
counter-based authentication mechanism to resist against replay attack. In or-
der to resist against stolen-verifier attack [17], we replace the static long-term
key KFH with a Diffie-Hellman key. The new scheme can also resist against a
range of attacks such as offline password guessing attacks and denial of service
attack, even if the smart card is stolen.
Before the system begins, HA generates two secret large primes p, q and
computes the number n = pq. The home agent HA chooses a multiplication
group G and an element g ∈ G with order q′, where p′ and q′ are public large
primes and p′ = 2q′ + 1 is the modulus for the group G (p′, q′ is different
from p, q). The HA selects a private key SHA = a (< q′) and computes the
public key PHA = ga mod p′. Similarly, the foreign agent FA selects a private
key SFA = b (< q′) and computes the public key PFA = gb mod p′. The new
protocol has three phases: registration, login and authentication, and password
change.
5.1 Registration Phase
Step 1. The MU chooses his/her own identity IDMU and password PWMU ,
and generates a large random number d. He/she then computes the hash value
f = h(IDMU‖PWMU‖d), and sends the registration message IDMU , f to the
HA via a secure channel.
Step 2. HA computes K∗MU = h(IDMU‖x) ⊕ f using the secret random num-
ber x. HA then initiates a counter ctrMU = 0 for MU and creates a record
(IDMU , ctrMU ) in its database. HA then personalizes the smart card with
h(·),K∗MU , ctrMU , n and sends it to MU.
Step 3. After receiving the smart card, the MU computes f∗ = h(IDMU ⊕
PWMU ⊕ d) and stores f∗ in the smart card. Finally, the smart card contains
h(·),K∗MU , f∗, n, d, ctrMU .
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5.2 Login and Authentication Phase
Step 1. MU → FA : M1. MU inserts his/her smart card into the device and
enters his/her identity IDMU and password PW ′MU . The smart card computes
f ′ = h(IDMU ⊕ PW ′MU ⊕ d) and verifies whether f∗ = f ′ or not. If f∗ = f ′,
the login phase terminates immediately. Otherwise, the smart card computes
KMU = K∗MU ⊕ h(IDMU‖PWMU‖d). Then MU generates a random number
nMU and computes ctrMU = ctrMU + 1, V1 = (IDMU‖KMU‖nMU‖ctrMU
‖IDFA)2 mod n. Finally, MU sends a login message M1 = (V1, ctrMU , IDHA)
to FA.
Step 2. FA → HA : M2. FA computes K = P bHA mod p′ = gab mod p′, V2 =
h(V1‖ctrMU‖K). Subsequently, FA sends the message M2 = (M1, IDFA, V2)
to HA.
Step 3. HA → FA : M3. HA checks whether IDFA is the identity of an
ally. If it is true, HA compares K = P aFA mod p
′ = gab mod p′ and V ∗2 =
h(V1‖ctrMU‖K). If V2 = V ∗2 , HA terminates the protocol. Otherwise, HA
solves V1 by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem with p and q to get
IDMU ,KMU , nMU , ctrMU , IDFA. Then, the HA verifies the retrieved ctrMU
with the stored ctr′MU corresponding to IDMU . If ctrMU > ctr
′
MU , then the
HA proceeds to the next step. Otherwise, the HA rejects this message and
considers it as a replayed message. After that, HA computes h(IDMU‖x) and
compares it with the received KMU . If they are equal, the authenticity of
MU is ensured, and the HA replaces ctr′MU with the new counter ctrMU in
its database. Also, HA believes FA is the target foreign agent of MU. HA
computes SK = h(h(IDMU‖x)‖IDFA‖nMU‖ctrMU ), V3 = SK ⊕ h(K) and
V4 = h(V3‖K), where SK is the session key between FA and MU. Finally, HA
sends M3 = (V3, V4) to FA.
Step 4. FA → MU : M4. FA computes V ∗4 = h(V3‖K) and checks whether
V ∗4 = V4. If it is valid, FA computes SK = V3 ⊕ h(K) and V5 = h(SK‖PFA),
and sends M4 = V5 to MU.
Step 5. Upon receiving M4, MU computes SK∗ = h(h(IDMU‖x)‖IDFA‖nMU
‖ctrMU ). Then MU computes V ∗5 = h(SK∗‖PFA) and checks whether V ∗5 =
V5. If they are equal, then MU establishes trust with FA; otherwise, the au-
thentication fails.
5.3 Password Change Phase
When MU wants to renew a password, MU inserts his/her smart card into the
terminal and enters his/her identity IDMU , the old password PW oldMU , and the
new password PWnewMU . The smart card computes f
′ = h(IDMU ⊕PW oldMU ⊕d),
and then verifies whether f∗ = f ′ or not. If f∗ = f ′, the password change phase
is terminated immediately. Otherwise, the smart card retrieves KMU = K∗MU⊕
9
MU FA HA
M1 = (V1, ctrMU , IDHA) 
M2 = (M1, IDF A, V2) 
M3 = (V3, V4)
M4 = V5
Fig. 1 Message Flows in login and Authentication Phase.
h(IDMU‖PW oldMU‖d) and computes K∗∗MU = KMU ⊕ h(IDMU‖PWnewMU ‖d). Fi-
nally, the smart card stores K∗∗MU in place of K
∗
MU .
6 Security Analysis of The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and show that
it can resist different types of attacks and also provides user anonymity.
6.1 User Anonymity
It is very important and necessary for a secure authentication protocol to pro-
vide user anonymity [3,5]. From Figure 1, we can see that the communication
transcript reveals no information about the identity IDMU of the user. In
fact, IDMU is concealed in V1, only the person who knows the value of p, q
can solve the quadratic residue problem to obtain IDMU . In our scheme, the
secret value p, q is stored by HA. Therefore, the attacker including the FA
cannot identify the MU from the login message.
6.2 Security against Replay Attacks [18]
In our scheme, we used the counter based authentication mechanism to prevent
replay attacks. If the adversary replays the previous login message, then HA
will detect the attack when examining the counter ctrMU of the user MU. The
concrete step is as follows: During the login and authentication phase, when




2), it verifies the retrieved
counter ctrMU with the stored counter ctr′MU corresponding to the IDMU . If




2) is a replayed message, then the HA will
find that ctr′MU ≥ ctrMU . The HA will simply reject this message. Hence, our
scheme prevents the replay attacks through the use of counter.
6.3 Security against Impersonation Attacks [15]
We consider three types of impersonation attacks, namely MU impersonation
attack, FA impersonation attack, and HA impersonation attack.
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MUImpersonation. In order to impersonate the MU, the adversary must
obtain the value of IDMU ,KMU . We then consider two situations: (1) the
adversary compromises the user identity and password but the smart card is
secure; and (2) the adversary compromises the smart card but the user identity
and password are secure.
In the first case, it is obvious that adversary is unable to obtain the value
of KMU since the smart card is secure. Notice that KMU is concealed in
K∗MU = KMU ⊕ h(IDMU‖PWMU‖d) in the smart card. Since the smart card
is secure, the adversary is unable to obtain (K∗MU , d) or KMU .
In the second case, when the smart card is stolen and compromised, the
adversary can learn the values of (h(·),K∗MU , f∗, n, d, ctrMU ) in the smart
card. However, this time the adversary knows neither IDMU nor PWMU , and
again he/she cannot computes the value of KMU . We must also consider offline
password guessing attacks in this case, that is the adversary uses a brute force
search to find out the correct password. Let the adversary select randomly
an identity candidate ID′MU and a password candidate PW
′
MU . Then the
adversary can compute f ′ = h(ID′MU ⊕ PW ′MU ⊕ d) and then compare f ′
with f∗. If they are equal, the adversary may think that PW ′MU and ID
′
MU
as the correct password and real identity of the MU. In fact, the message pair
(ID′MU , PW
′
MU ) which satisfy the above equality is not unique. Even if this
attack can be carried out in the offline manner by repeatedly trying the next
identity candidate and password candidate, it is still a difficult problem for
the adversary to obtain the real IDMU , PWMU of the MU.
FA/HA Impersonation. Since FA and HA use Diffie-Hellman keys to au-
thenticate each other, the adversary is unable to impersonate either of them
due to the intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem. Also, the attacker
cannot impersonates FA to fool MU. Since he/she does not posses the se-
cret x and IDMU , nMU , the attacker cannot compute V5 = h(SK‖PFA) =
h(h(h(IDMU‖x)‖IDFA ‖nMU‖ctrMU )‖PFA). On the other hand, it is impos-
sible for him/her to obtain the session key SK by computing SK = V3⊕h(K)
due to the difficulty of solving Diffie-Hellman problem.
6.4 Secure Key Establishment [15]
At the end of the protocol, the MU, FA and HA will establish a common
session key SK = h(h(IDMU‖x)‖IDFA‖nMU‖ctrMU ). Since the attacker does
not know the value of x, he/she cannot compute the SK directly. Even if
the previous session keys are disclosed, the attacker cannot obtain any future
session key due to the security of one-way hash function.
6.5 Protection against Attacks in Section 4
In this section, we show how our new scheme overcomes the security weaknesses
presented in Section 4.
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1) In our proposed scheme, there is no verifier table in HA’s database to
store the secret information of MU or FA. Thus, the attacker cannot launch
stolen-verifier attack [17].
2) In order to prevent replay attack [18], we used the counter based au-
thentication mechanism. HA can detect the attack by examining the counter
ctrMU of the user MU.
3) In order to prevent denial of service attack [25], the smart card will
verify whether the PWMU entered by MU is correct or not in the login phase
and password update phase.
7 Performance Comparison
We compare our new scheme with two recently proposed smart card based
anonymous user authentication schemes due to He et al. [8] and Jiang et al.
[9]. In Table 2, we provide the comparison based on the key security of these
schemes, while we compare their efficiency in terms of computation and com-
munication cost in Table 3. The following notation are used in Table 3. th: The
time complexity of the hash computation; tm: The time complexity of the mod-
ular squaring computation; tqr: The time complexity of computing a square
root modulo n; tme: The time complexity of computing modular exponentia-
tion; tsym: The time complexity of symmetric encryption/decryption; tasym:
The time complexity of encryption/decryption or signature using asymmetric
cryptosystem.
From Table 2, we can conclude that our proposed scheme provides better
security and usability than the other two schemes. He et al.’s scheme [8] does
not satisfy any of the criteria listed in table 2. Jiang et.al.’s scheme [9] does
not satisfy four of the nine criteria. Our scheme can achieve all the criteria
listed in table 2. In particular, one special feature of our scheme is that we do
not require the HA to store some secret information that is shared with FA
in his/her database, which enhances our scheme’s security strength to resist
against different attacks.
In Table 3, we summarize the efficiency comparison between our scheme
and other schemes in [9,8]. From the table 3, it is easy to see that our scheme is
more efficient than He et al.’s scheme [8]. Our scheme requires two extra Mod-
ular Exponentiation for FA and HA as compared with Jiang et al.’s scheme.
It is not a problem because the FA and the HA are powerful servers. On the
other hand, our scheme achieves stronger security than the previous solutions,
as is shown in Table 2.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed several security weaknesses in a recently proposed
smart card based privacy preservation user authentication scheme by Jiang et
al. We showed that this scheme is vulnerable to stolen-verifier attacks, replay
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Table 2 Security and Usability Comparison
Feature He et al. [8] Jiang [9] Ours
Correct Password Update No No Yes
Stolen-verifier-table resistance No No Yes
User Anonymity No Yes Yes
Mutual Authentication No Yes Yes
Strong Replay Resistance No No Yes
Key Agreement No Yes Yes
Password protection No Yes Yes
Two-factor security No Yes Yes
Denial of service resistance No No Yes
Table 3 Efficiency Comparison
Jiang et al. [9] He et al. [8] Ours
C1 3th + tm 10th + 2tsym 3th + tm
C2 4th th + tasym 3th + tme
C3 5th + tqr 4th + 2tsym + 4tasym 5th + tme + tqr
C4 1 1 1
C5 1 1 1
C6 4 5 4
C7 6 6 5
C1: Computation cost of the MU
C2: Computation cost of the FA
C3: Computation cost of the HA
C4: Communication rounds between the MU and FA
C5: Communication rounds between the FA and HA
C6: Total messages transmitted between the MU and FA
C7: Total messages transmitted between the FA and HA
attacks, and denial of service attack. In order to withstand its security flaws,
subsequntly we proposed a new smart card based user authentication scheme
with user’s anonymity for roaming service which can achieve stronger security.
Our scheme does not require HA to store a verifier-table in its database and
uses counter based authentication mechanism to prevent replay attacks.
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